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NOTES
PERMISSIBLE SCOPE OF STOCKHOLDER PROPOSALS
UNDER SEC PROXY RULES*
TODAY'S corporate proxy statement, potentially a ballot, a newspaper, and
a suggestion box, represents the closest tie between a large corporation's man-
agement and the widely scattered stockholders. To regulate its use, the proxy
section of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 1 grants to the Securities and
Exchange Commission discretionary power in the most general terms to pre-
scribe rules "necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the protec-
tion of investors." 2
Extending the full disclosure principle of the Act, the Securities and Ex-
change Commission in Rule X-14A-8 3 has gone beyond specification of the
minima of information which must be included in proxy statements I in order
* SEC v. Transamerica Corp., 163 F.2d 511 (C.C.A. 3d 1947), cert. denied, 68 Sup. Ct.
351 (1948).
1. § 14(a), 48 STAT. 895 (1934), 15 U.S.C. § 78n (1940). See, generally, as to the regula-
tion of the solicitation of proxies, Hearings Before Committee on Interstate and Foreign Com-
merce on H.R. 1493, H.R. 1821, and H.R. 2019, 78th Cong., 1st Sess. (1943); Axe, Corporate
Proxies, 41 MicE. L. REv. 38,225 (1942); Bernstein and Fischer, The Regulation of the Solici-
tation of Proxies: Some Reflections on Corporate Democracy, 7 U. OF Cau, L. REv. 226 (1940);
Dean, Non-Compliance with Proxy Regulations: Effect on Ability of Corporation to Hold Valid
Meeting, 24 CORN. L. Q. 483 (1939); Notes, 53 HARv. L. REv. 1165 (1940), 13 ST. JoHN's
L. REv. 297 (1939).
2. The section makes it unlawful for any person to use the mails or instrumentalities
of interstate commerce "to solicit any proxy . . . in respect of any security . . . registered
on any national securities exchange in contravention of such rules and regulations as the
Commission may prescribe . . . in the public interest or for the protection of investors."
No rules have as yet been promulgated under § 14(b), which provides for regulation of the
proxies of members of exchanges, brokers and dealers.
3. Prior to the latest revision of the proxy rules, Sec. Exch. Act Release No. 4037,
Dec. 17, 1947, 12 FED. REG. 8768 (1947), replacing 17 CODE FED. REGS. § 240.14a-1 through
§ 240.14a-9 (Cum. Supp. 1944), this rule was denominated X-14A-7, and was substantially
similar. See 17 CODE FED. REGS. § 240.14a-7 (Cum. Supp. 1944). Although the Trans-
america case arose under the old rules, references in this note will be to the rule numbers
of the new regulation, since the changes do not affect the matters herein discussed.
The rules apply to those companies regulated by the Securities Exchange Act, which
comprise those corporations whose securities are listed on national securities exchanges, and
also companies subject to the Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935 by § 12, 49 STAT.
823 (1935), 15 U.S.C. § 791(e) (1940), and the Investment Company Act of 1940 by § 20 (a),
54 STAT. 822 (1940), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-20(a) (1940).
4. Rule X-14A-3 and Schedule 14A prescribe the information to be included in the
proxy statements, while Rule X-14A-5 outlines how the information shall be presented, and
Rule X-14A-9 prohibits false or misleading information. On each matter to be acted
upon, means by which the stockholders can specify their vote must be provided, under
Rule X-14A-4. Rule X-14A-7 specifies the information which must be mailed to a security
holder at his request, and the communications and solicitations to be mailed to stockholders
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to aid the stockholder himself in initiating proposals for collective action.
In effect, the rule permits an enterprising security holder to make use of the
management's proxy statement to set his own ideas before a stockholders'
meeting, provided his proposals are "proper subjects" for action by the se-
curity holders.5
Choosing not to define the subjects which are "proper," the Commission
has stated in a public release that propriety is to be determined by the law
of the state of incorporation. 6 Since under state law the stockholder's right
to propose from the floor is frequently an empty one, litigation regarding
the right has been rare. Where undertaken the results have not been signally
favorable to the lone stockholder, unsupported by administrative regulation.7
The consequences of referring the scope of this new federal remedy to state
law unprepared for the issue in this context are indicated in the first case to
arise under Rule X-14A-8, SEC v. Transamerica Corp.8
A stockholder proposed elimination of an existing by-law provision re-
quiring that notice of any proposed by-law amendment be contained in the
notice of the stockholders' meeting; the provision had been used by the man-
agement, the stockholder charged, to screen out arbitrarily proposals which
it opposed.9 In addition, he proposed a by-law amendment providing for
independent, stockholder-elected auditors and a resolution demanding that
reports of the proceedings of the annual meetings be sent to the stockhold-
at the instance and expense of any stockholder, while Rule X-14A-S requires the publica-
tion of stockholder proposals by the corporation.
5. Rule X-14A-8 provides: "(a) If any security holder entitled to vote at a meeting
of security holders of the issuer shall submit to the management of the issuer a reasonable
time before such meeting a proposal which is a proper subject for action by the security
holders and which is accompanied by notice of his intention to present the proposal for action
at the meeting, the management shall set forth the proposal in its proxy statement and shall
identify the proposal in its form of proxy and provide means by which security holders can
make the specification provided for by Rule X-14A-4 (a) . . . [see note 4 supral
"(b) If the management opposes such proposal, it shall also, at the request of the security
holder, include in its proxy statement the name and address of the security holder and a
statement of the security holder setting forth, in not more than one hundred words, the
reasons advanced by him in support of the proposal.... Neither the management nor the
issuer shall be responsible for such statement."
6. Sec. Exch. Act Release No. 3638 (1945), 11 FED. REG. 10995, § 271.735 (1946).
The release consists of a letter of the Commission to a company, stating that the latter was
not required to put before the stockholders certain proposals of a political nature, and stating
that proper subjects were to be determined by state law.
7. Hornstein, Legal Controls for Intracorporate Abusc-Present and Future, 41 COL. L.
Rlv. 405 (1941); Hornstein, New Aspects of Stockholders' Derirative Suits, 47 COL. L. Rnv. 1
(1947).
8. 163 F.2d 511 (C.C.A. 3d 1947), cert. denied, 68 Sup. Ct. 351 (1948).
9. The proposed amendment was to be introduced only if the management resorted
to what the stockholder considered "the extremely undemocratic method of trying to avoid
a vote, for approval or rejection, of the other resolutions, by ruling them out of order." See
Appellant's Appendix and Addendum, p. Ila, SEC v. Transamerica Corp., 163 F.2d 511
(C.C.A. 3d 1947).
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ers.' ° When Transamerica balked at including the proposals in the proxy
statements, the SEC sued to enjoin the solicitation of proxies for the annual
meeting until the proposals should be included." The Circuit Court of Ap-
peals, modifying the district court judgment, 2 determined that all three
proposals were proper.
Both courts, considering themselves bound by the Commission's interpre-
tation of its own rule,' 3 referred to state law to determine as best they could
the propriety of the proposals. Under Delaware statutes stockholders may
have power to amend by-laws,' 4 and the principal question as to the proposed
amendments was whether the notice provision in the by-laws could be used
by Transamerica's management to affect this power. 15 The Circuit Court, in
finding that it could not, apparently had to rely both on the statute and on
the fortuitous inclusion of a provision in Transamerica's own charter con-
firming the stockholders' power to amend. 16 As to the resolution to send
reports to the stockholders, the Court, finding no applicable precedent in
10. The stockholder also proposed that the meeting place be changed from Delaware
to California. The directors' compliance with the request rendered moot the question of its
propriety.
11. The extent of the remedy allowable was one of the issues in the case, but is outside
the scope of this note. The District Court was held to have power, under § 27 of the Act,
48 STAT. 902 (1934), 15 U.S.C. § 78aa (1940), to enjoin all threatened violations of the Act,
and to compel resolicitation of all stockholders on the proposals in the case. SEC v. Trans-
america Corp., 163 F.2d 511, 518 (1947).
12. SEC v. Transamerica Corp., 67 F. Supp. 326 (D. Del. 1946). The court, after ruling
that by-law amendments could not be made except by full compliance with the notice provi-
sion in the by-laws, found it possible to uphold the Commission with respect to the auditor
proposal by calling it a "mandate to the directors" rather than a by-law amendment. The
resolution asking for reports of annual meetings was disallowed as a matter properly within
the discretion of the directors.
13. See Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co., 325 U.S. 410 (1945) (administrative
agency's interpretation of its own regulation is of "controlling weight unlesg it is plainly
erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation"). But cf. Kraus & Bros. v. United States, 327
U.S. 614 (1946)(court overruled agency's interpretation in a criminal case).
14. "The original by-laws of a corporation may be adopted by the incorporators. There.
after, the power to make, alter, or repeal by-laws shall be in the stockholders, but any cor-
poration may, in the certificate of incorporation, confer that power upon the directors,"
DEL. REV. CODE § 2044 (1935).
15. In general, where no by-law change is mentioned in the notice of a meeting, a by-
law or by-law amendment passed by stockholders at such a meeting is invalid, Mutual Fire
Ins. Co. v. Farquhar, 86 Md. 668, 39 AtI. 527 (1898). This rule was specifically relied upon
by Transamerica. See Affidavit of Harry Heller, Appellant's Appendix and Addendum,
p. 40a, SEC v. Transamerica Corp., 163 F.2d 511 (C.C.A. 3d 1947). But see note 9 supra.
16. Article X of the company charter conferred on the directors the power to make by-
laws, but provided that "the by-laws made by the directors and the powers so conferred
may be altered or repealed by the stockholders." See Appellant's Appendix and Addendum,
p. 49a, SEC v. Transamerica Corp., 163 F.2d 511 (C.C.A. 3d 1947). The article, taken in
conjunction with the statute, note 14 supra, would seem to be conclusive as to the stock-
holders' power to amend. Rogers v. Hill, 289 U.S. 582 (1933) (New Jersey statute provided,
in almost identical language, what was here provided by statute and charter together). And
see 8 FLETCHER, CYcLOPEDIA OF CORPORATIONS § 4178 (1931).
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state law, merely asserted that its propriety "seems to us to be scarcely
arguable."
In considering the propriety of the resolution for annual meeting reports,
the court found no statute or case directly in point. Presumably it consid-
ered, but found too general to be decisive, the Delaware statute, common in
other states, which provides that the business of corporations shall be man-
aged by the directors, except as may otherwise be provided in statutes or in
the articles of incorporation; 17 cases involving differeint causes of action,
such as stockholders' suits, afforded a similarly inadequate criterion for the
propriety of proposals under the new rule.9 With no precedent available,
the court took judicial notice of the number and dispersion of the stockhold-
ers, and concluded that information about the corporate affairs was neces-
sary if stockholders were to act together in their joint interest. This practical
consideration, consonant with the policy of the Securities Exchange Act,
seemed determinative, since the court could "perceive no logical basis" for
concluding that the proposal was not a proper subject for action. Although
a possible inference from the holding is that any proposal not specifically
prohibited by state law is proper, the opinion seemed to imply, rather, that
where state law. left a hiatus, the purpose and spirit of the Act should be
invoked to fill the breach. 19
The proposed by-law amendments, unlike the resolution, presented two
initial questions of statutory construction. The first, as to the effect under
17. DEL. REV. CODE § 2041 (1935). Most other states have similar provisions, e.g.,
Cow. CODE OF CAL. § 800 (1947), replacing CAL. CIVIL CODE § 305 (Deering, 1941); ILL.
STAT. ANN. § 157.33 (Smith-Hurd, 1936); IND. STAT. AxsN. § 25-208 (Burns, 1933); MASS.
ANN. LAWS, tit. 22, c. 156, § 25 (1933); MIcE. STATS. AazN. § 21.13 (1937); N.J. STrAT.A m.
§ 14:7-1 (1939); N.Y. GE-,. CORP. LAW § 27 (MoKinney, 1943); OHIo Gis;. CODE Ar.
§ 8623-55 (Page, 1938); TEx. Crv. STAT., tit. 32, art. 1327 (Vernon, 1945); VIs. SrAT., tit. 17,
§ 180.13 (1945).
18. Most states have no statute bearing on the point. Two exceptions are California,
which requires that minutes be kept, but makes no provision as to reports to stockholders,
CORP. CODE OF CAL. § 3000 (1947), replacing CAL. CIvIL CODE § 352 (Deering, 1941), and
Illinois, which gives stockholders the statutory right to examine the corporate books, includ-
ing minutes, ILL. ANN. STAT. § 157.45 (Smith-Hurd, 1936). In the absence of statute, there
is no rule of law which requires that a corporation shall even keep a minute book. Vood-
haven Bank v. Brooklyn Hills Improvement Co., 69 App. Div. 4S9, 74 N.Y. Supp. 1023
(2d Dept. 1902).
Were there no federal act overshadowing the issues in the instant case, the court here
might have voiced similar sentiments to those expressed in MacCrone v. American Capital
Corp., 51 F. Supp. 462 (D. Del. 1943). There a stockholder contended that mere compliance
with the usual two day meeting notice, where a complicated merger was to be voted on, %ias
insufficient, unreasonable and undemocratic, and the court answered that such a contention
was at war with the "dominant purpose of the Delaware Corporation Law to insure simpli-
fied corporate practice and procedure by vesting wide discretion in the board of directors."
At least it may be stated that whatever precedent exists under state law as to the reso-
lution here did not compel the ruling. See generally, DoRIs AND FRIED31AN, CORORATE
MEETINGS, MINUTES, AND RESOLUTIONS 1-43 (1941).
19. Seenote 28infra.
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the Delaware statute 20 of the notice requirement in Transamerica's by-laws,
being determined in favor of the stockholder, there was little doubt here as
to the second issue of the general power of a Transamerica stockholder to
propose by-law amendments, in view of the corporate charter and the Dela-
ware statute. The holding in this case, however, is far from determinative of
the stockholder's power to propose by-law amendments in other states and
for other corporations. In some states by-law amendments are wholly in the
hands of directors, 21 and in others they are as clearly within the control of
the stockholders.22 In these instances, the propriety of amendments as such
will depend on the statute itself. In many other states, the statutes permit
the individual corporation to decide, by its own charter and by-laws, who
shall amend; 23 in these states the permissibility of amendments in general
will depend on the particular corporation's charter or by-laws, at least within
the limits of public policy. 24 It is only in the states where statutes make no
provision as to who shall amend,2 6 that the court, guided by whatever case
law exists, will have wide discretion.2 6
Once it is determined, however, that the stockholder has the amending
power per se, the tenor of the opinion here does not permit the propriety of
his particular proposals for amendment under the SEC rule to be curtailed
by procedural blocks imposed by management. Furthermore, the case ex-
plicitly holds that the usual statute granting managerial control to directors
20. See note 14 supra.
21. See, e.g., D.C. CODE, pt. 5, § 29-208 (1940); TEx. Civ. STAT., tit. 32, art. 1326 (Ver-
non, 1945).
22. See, e.g., CORP. CODE OF CAL. § 500 (1947),replacing CAL. CIVIL CODE §301 (Deer-
ing, 1941); LA. GEN. STAT., tit. 14, § 1109 (Dart, 1939); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14:3-2 (1939);
OnIo GEN. CODE ANN. § 8623-12 (Page, 1938); PA. STAT. ANN., tit. 15, § 2852-304 (Purdon,
1938).
23. See, e.g., DEL. REV. CODE § 2044 (1935); ILL. STAT. ANN., c. 32, § 157.25 (Smith-
Hurd, 1936); IND. STAT. ANN. § 25-206 (Burns, 1933); ANN. LAWS OF MASS., c. 156, § 13
(1933); MICH. STAT. ANN. § 21.16 (1937); N.Y. GEN. CoRP. LAW, § 27 (McKinney, 1943).
24. Judicial limitation of corporate discretion under the mandate of state law is exem-
plified by People's Home Savings Bank v. Superior Court, 104 Cal. 649, 38 Pac. 452 (1894).
Under a statutory provision that "[a] corporation may by its by-laws, where no other provi-
sion is specially made, provide for . . . the mode of voting by proxy," the corporation had
attempted to enforce a by-law stipulating that only stockholders of the corporation could
serve as proxies. The court held the by-law invalid, saying that the statute gave to the cor-
poration the power to regulate the exercise of the right, but "no power to so shackle the
right as to result in its nullification." People's Home Savings Bank v. Superior Court, supra
at 654,38 Pac. at 453.
25. See, e.g., NEv. Coup. LAws § 1607(6) (Hillyer, 1929); ORE. CouP. LAWS ANN.
§ 77-239(6) (1940); Wis. STAT., tit. 17 (1945).
26. The present status of state law as to the amendment of corporate charters, as it
affects stockholder proposals under the rule, is very similar to that obtaining as to by-law
amendments. See SEC, REPORT ON THE STUDY AND INVESTIGATION OF THE WOR, ACTIV-
ITIES, PERSONNEL AND FUNCTIONS OF PROTECTIVE AND REORGANIZATION COMMITTrEs,
pt. VII, app. B, 1 (1938); Dodd, Dissenting Stockholders andAmendmentsto Corporate Charters
75 U. OF PA. L. REV. 585, 723 (1927).
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does not prohibit such proposals for by-law amendments as the independent
auditor proposal here, which are not "peculiarly within the discretion of the
directors." Again as to by-law amendments the inference may be drawn that
where no specific statute prohibits the proposal, courts should be guided by
the purposes of the federal act.Y
It is apparent, however, that the intent of Congress as expressed in the
Act furnishes less specific if more relevant criteria for determining propriety
than does state law: the substantive meaning of the Rule is now merely to
be judged by two nebulous standards instead of one. The Transamerica case
seems to indicate that some further definition of the permissible scope of
proposals would be a valuable guide to the courts.2 Since the states are not
likely to engage in further regulation of their corporations touching on the
stockholder-director relationship," such definition might well be attempted
by the Commission to the extent of its statutory powers.
The Commission's power to define proper subjects has not been generally
considered to extend, under the Act, to the reallocation of control between
stockholders and management." The proxy section itself does not grant
positive power to effect the change; the Committee Reports on the section
evidence, rather, a primary intent to inform the stockholder and to allow
him to vote fairly on each issue for which stockholder action is necessary.A'
While a stockholder's understanding of the major questions of policy to be
decided at shareholders' meetings is considered important, the Reports do
not mention his power to vote as to specific issuesA2
27. In a dictum the court was more explicit on the point. Assuming arguendo that
Transamerica's use of the notice by-law was allowed by state law, the court went on to say
that the power conferred on the Commission by Congress could not be "frustrated by a
corporate by-law." The court had no doubt but what the Commission's rule represented a
proper exercise of its authority under a statute which was intended to strike at "the control
of great corporations by a very few persons."
28. Further definition should also be of some assistance to corporate management in
determining which proposals it is required to include in proxy statements. Although it is
clear that under the present rule proposals must have some relevance to the corporate enter-
prise, see note 6 supra, the extent of the proposing power cannot be considered clearly delin-
eated. Management has also feared corporate liability in case of inclusion in the pro.xy state-
ment of defamatory proposals. See Hearings, supra note 1, at 105-2 1.
29. Competition among the states for corporate franchise taxes and incorporation fees,
a widely recognized practice, keeps statutory control at a minimum. See, generally, Dodd,
Statutory Derelopments in Business Corporation Law, 1886-1936, 50 HAnv. L. Rrv. 27, 38,
42-3, 57 (1936); Flynn, Why Corporations Leare Home, 150 ATLAnTxc MO.THLY 268 (1932);
Rutledge, Significant Trends in Modern Incorporation Statutes, 3 U. op Prrr. L. Rnv. 273,
278 (1937); Stoke, Economic Influences Upon the Corporation Laws of New Jersey, 28 J. POL.
EcoN. 551 (1930).
30. As stated byformer SEC Chairman Purcel"... the rights that ve are endeavor-
ing to assure to the stockholders are those rights that he has traditionally had under State
law to appear at the meeting; to make a proposal; to speak on that proposal at appropriate
length; and to have his proposal voted on." Hearings, supra note 1, at 172.
31. See SEN. REP. No. 792, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. (1934); H.R. REP. No. 1383, 73d Cong.,
2d Sess. (1934).
32. Under state law, it is well settled that matters within the directors' discretion are
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Short of outright combat with existing state law, however, there appear
to be two feasible policies through which the SEC might at least extend its
sphere of influence. Clear articulation of the Commission's views as to proper
subjects for shareholder action would serve as a guide to the courts and the
corporations, and as a mere recommendation would be well within the Com-
mission's power. Since, as indicated in the Transamerica case, the courts
may look for federal authority where state law is silent as to the permissible
scope of proposals, the Commission might do well .to supply that authority
in some detail.33
Further expansion of the scope of Rule X-14A-8, moreover, seems justifi-
able as a means of increasing the shareholder's understanding of his enter-
prise. Since stockholder proposals are themselves informative, in that they
function as cross-currents of new ideas and information among the security
holders, they might be subject to SEC regulation as mere proposals, if not
as mandates to the directors. The Commission might, to the extent of prac-
ticability, itemize the principal kinds of proposals which it would consider
proper subjects for shareholder action, and at least enforce their inclusion
in the proxy statement, regardless of state law.34 If under state law the mat-
beyond the reach of stockholder vote. Shickel v. Berryville Land & Improvement Co,, 99
Va. 88, 37 S.E. 813 (1901) (stockholder resolution as to matters within directors' discretion
not binding on directors); Whitfield v. Kern, 120 N.J. Eq. 115, 184 Atl. 333 (Cli., 1936)
(similar result, even where stockholder vote was unanimous). But cf. Miller v. Vander-
lip, 285 N. Y. 116,33 N.E.2d 51 (1941) (stockholdermay urge on directors acourse of action in
the interest of the company). The promulgation of a federal rule forcing action by the
directors, where approved by the stockholders, on matters previously within the discretion-
ary power of the directors would effect a substantial change in the relative powers of the
two groups, and it might well be argued that a change of this magnitude would be further
specified in the statute, had- Congress intended it. Such a change would approach federal
incorporation, which was seriously considered before and after the passage of the Act, but
never enacted. See TWENTIETH CENTURY FUND, Srocx MARKET CONTROL 170-3 (1934);
Berlack, Federal Incorporation and Securities Legislation, 49 HARv. L. Rtv. 396 (1936).
The argument for the validity of the broader interpretation would rely on the strong
emphasis in the House Committee Report, note 31 supra, on "fair corporate suffrage," on
the very broad statutory standards previously referred to, and on the liberal treatment since
accorded the Act as a whole in the courts. See, e.g., SEC v. Okin, 132 F.2d 784 (C.C.A. 2d
1943) (Commission under § 14 (a) could restrain not only the solicitation of proxies, but the
publication of "false and misleading letters relating to proxies"); Shawmut Ass'n v. SEC,
146 F.2d 791 (C.C.A. 1st 1945) (Commission held empowered to demand approval of speci-
fied percentages of shareholders as a condition of delisting under § 12(d) of the Act, which
merely granted the Commission power to approve delisting "on such terms as the Commis.
sion may deem necessary to impose for the protection of investors").
33. Landis observes, as to the activities of the SEC: "As in the case of the Interstate
Commerce Commission, it was not long before it became evident that the mere proscription
of abuses was insufficient to effect the realization of the broad objectives that lay behind the
movement for securities legislation. The primary emphasis of administrative activity had
to center upon the guidance and supervision of the industry as a whole." LANDIS, Tun
ADmiNisTRATzvE PROcESS 15 (1938).
34. The extent to which Congress intends to incorporate in a federal statute pre-existing
concepts of state law is frequently a matter for dispute. If the particular problem involved
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ter proposed were discretionary with the directors rather than subject to
shareholder action, the proposals would have only the force of a recommenda-
tion, but the ideas embodied therein would be communicated to the stock-
holders for their approval or disapproval. Expansion of the rule would not
only provide greater protection of the shareholder's equity through a fuller
utilization of the proxy statement but would go far toward the establishment
of the shareholder body as an advisory council to the corporation.35
MANAGEMENT TRADING DURING PUBLIC UTILITY
REORGANIZATION*
ADmiSTRATIVE regulations of prospective applicability may be consid-
ered generally preferable to ad Iwc decisions.' Recognition of this truism was
urged upon the SEC by the Supreme Court in SEC v. Chenery Corporation= 2
in the case is, according to the statute, to be dealt with on a national scale, and byanational
administrative agency, the presumption is strong, in the absence of a plain indication to the
contrary, "'that Congress . . . is not making the application of the federal act dependent
on state law.'" NLRB v. Hearst Publications, 322 U.S. 111, 123 (1944) (newsboys held
"employees" within meaning of Wagner Act provision, despite state precedent characteriz-
ing them as independent contractors). That is, the statute is to be interpreted by the agency
with reference to the needs of national policy.
35. "A standing criticism of the use of corporations in business is that it causes such
business to be owned by people who do not know anything about it. Argument has not been
supposed to be necessary in order to show that the divorce between the powver of control
and knowledge is an evil." Holmes, J., dissenting in Liggett Co. v. Baldridge, 278 U.S. 105,
114 (1928). The desirability of a greater expression of opinion on the part of the stockholder
was suggested in SEARS, THE NEW PLACE OF THE STOCKHOLDER 157-3 (1929), while Profes-
sors Berle, in Protection of Non-Voting Stock, 4 HARv. Bus. REV. 257, 263-4 (1926) and
Ripley, in ALuN STREET AND WALL STREET 153, 154 (1929), had urged the creation of perma-
nent committees to represent the stockholders with the management. The unquestionable
apathy of the stockholder with regard to his voting rights, noted in BERLE ,.D MEA;s, THE
MODERN CORPORATION AND PIVATE PROPERTY 286, 287 (1932), has led some obzervers to
despair of the effectiveness of the whole system of proxy voting, Rutledge, supra note 29, at
296, but it seems at least questionable whether stockholder apathy has not been partially
caused by lack of opportunity to vote effectively. In any case, it is clear that the proxy cec-
tion represents an attempt to nourish the possibly moribund institution of corporate suffrage,
and the rules must be viewed in this context.
A counter argument, to the effect that the rule would bring on a flood of crackpot pro-
posals, was raised by the district court, SEC v. Transamerica Corp., 67 F. Supp. at 326, 332
(D. Del. 1946), as to X-14A-8 in the instant case. Such a fear would appear unrealistic,
even in the absence of a high degree of stockholder apathy, for crackpot and other im-
proper proposals could be excluded under the Commission's rule.
* Cities Service Company, SEC Holding Co. Act Release No. 7720, Sept. 30, 1947;
American States Utilities Corporation, SEC Holding Co. Act Release No. 7721, Oct. 2,1947.
1. See, generally, GELLEORN, ADuINISTRATIVE LAW, CASES AND Cont ;Ts 179 (2d
ed. 1947); Dodd, Administratie Agencies As Legislators And Judges, 25 A.B.A.J. 923,973
(1939); Note, 56 HARv. L. REv. 1002 (1943); see Addison v. Holly Hill Fruit Products, Inc.,
322 U.S. 607, 620 (1944).
2. SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194 (1947). See note 4 infra.
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as the better method of coping with utility reorganization plans designed to
enhance the value of management securities acquired during reorganization.,
In that case the Court had ultimately upheld the Commission's rejection of
a reorganization plan which evinced a blatant favoritism for officers' securi-
ties; 4 nevertheless the majority twice expressed general disapproval of case-
by-case treatment.5
Despite this expression of opinion by the highest tribunal, the SEC has
not seen fit to promulgate a prospective regulation, and two recent cases
suggest that the Court's good advice has had a curiously unfortunate effect.
In the Matters of Cities Service Company 6 and American States Ulilities Cor-
poration,7 officers of registered holding companies had bought stock of the
corporations after commencement of reorganization proceedings under the
Public Utility Holding Company Act. Subsequent to the purchase, the of-
ficers submitted proposals for simplification of the corporate structures which
called for their securities to be treated on parity with publicly owned shares.
3. Utility reorganization proceedings are governed by §§ 7 and 11(e) of the Public
Utility Holding Company Act, 49 STAT. 815, 822 (1935), 15 U.S.C. §§ 79g, 79k(e) (1940).
Section 11(e) places the power to initiate the plan on behalf of all classes of security holders
in the hands of the management. In Bankruptcy Act reorganizations of large corporations,
on the other hand, a disinterested trustee who may not be either a creditor or a stockholder
is charged with preparation of the plan. 52 STAT. 888 (1938), 11 U.S.C. §§ 556, 558 (1940);
52 STAT. 890 (1938), 11 U.S.C. § 569 (1940). See Federal Water Service Corp., SEC Holding
Co. Act Release No. 5584, pp. 22-4, Feb. 7, 1945; 10 U. OF CHI. L. REV. 70 (1942).
For appraisal of the consequence of fiduciary trading during reorganizations see SEC,
REPORT ON THE STUDY AND INVESTIGATION OF THE WORK, ACTIVITIES, PERSONNEL AND
FUNCTIONS OF PROTECTIVE AND REORGANIZATION COmTTEES (hereinafter cited as SEC,
REPORT ON REORGANIZATION COMMITTEES) pt. II, 315-51 (1937); pt. III, 132 (1936); pt.
VIII, 196-204 (1940); see Tn re Republic Gas Corp., 35 F. Supp. 300,303-5 (S.D.N.Y. 1936);
Comment, 47 YALE L. J. 229 (1937); Note, 46 YALE L. J. 143, 147-8 (1936).
For trading abuses by officers of all types of corporations during non-reorganization
periods, see SEN. REP. No. 1455, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 55-68 (1934).
4. Management cornered most of the preferred stock in reorganization trading, and
then proposed to the SEC that this class of stock be accorded preferential treatment. Tile
SEC, basing its order on general equitable principles, refused to approve the plan unless the
fiduciary holdings acquired during reorganization were surrendered to the corporation at
cost. Federal Water Service Corp., 8 S.E.C. 893 (1941). As so amended, the plan subse-
quently received Commission approval over the objections of several officers. Federal Water
Service Corp., 10 S.E.C. 200 (1941). The latter went into the courts and were upheld by the
Supreme Court in their contentions that general equity principles do not automatically pre-
clude corporate managers from security trading. SEC v. Chenery Corp., 318 U. S. 80 (1943).
Upon remand for further proceedings, the Commission again refused equal participation to
management shares, but grounded its decision on the "fair reorganization" goal of §§ 7 and
11 of the Public Utility Holding Company Act and not on general equity doctrines. Fed-
eral Water Service Corp., SEC Holding Co. Act Release No. 5584, Feb. 7, 1945. The Court,
hearing the case for a second time, supported the Commission's stand. SEC v. Chenery
Corp., supra note 2.
5. 318 U.S. 80, 92 (1943); 332 U.S. 194, 203 (1947).
6. SECHolding Co. Act Release No. 7720, Sept. 30, 1947.
7. SEC Holding Co. Act Release No. 7721, Oct. 2, 1947.
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The SEC in approving the reorganization plans emphasized the Chenery
deprecation of the ad koc approach. 8 Thus so long as no suitable regulation is
enunciated, the Chenery warning serves only to render the SEC chary of
striking down reorganization schemes tainted by management trading. Un-
der these circumstances articulation of some general principle seems partic-
ularly desirable.
One suggestion involves a simple declaration of policy against manage-
ment's purchase of securities during reorganization-the question of the
good faith behind particular transactions to be reserved for postfacto deter-
mination.9 This approach while differing from the present mode of regula-
tion only in that policy is enunciated by administrative promulgation rather
than through case decision is, however, sufficiently compliant with the Chen-
ery warning to permit uninhibited frustration of future questionable plans.
But adoption of this proposal does not liquidate difficulties inherent in the
present system of control. First, the task of investigating motives behind
fiduciary trades places a premium on efforts to disguise unsavory dealings
as innocent."0 Secondly, although subsequent penalization of management
shares without a further change in the reorganization plan (as in the Chenery
situation) would take the profits out of proscribed trading, it would not nec-
essarily make whole the outside holdings injured by the breach of manage-
8. The majority of the Commission in both cases made frequent reference to the
Chenery warning. See, e.g., SEC Holding Co. Act Release No. 7720, pp. 10, 15, Sept. 30,
1947 and SEC Holding Co. Act Release No. 7721, pp. 8, 9, 11, Oct. 2, 1947. For the
admonition's even stronger impression on the two SEC members who concurred in the two
Commission decisions, seeSEC Holding Co. Act Release No. 7720, p. 21, Sept. 30,1947.
In addition to the emphasis placed on this arning, indeterminate weight was accorded
by the SEC to other factors. Particular stress was given to the fact that unlike the Chenery
case, the instant cases did not involve a concerted effort by management to acquire control
over any class of security. In addition the Commission enumerated, without specific com-
ment, other circumstances urged by the managers in distinguishing the Cities Serricr re-
organization from that of the Cheyery case: (1) the solvent conditions of the utilities here
being reorganized, (2) the relatively small amount of trading involved, (3) the fact that the
company and not the public would benefit if the fiduciary shares were denied equal participa-
tion since all public holdings had been paid off in full. SEC Holding Co. Act Release No.
7720, pp. 10-11,14-15, Sept. 30, 1947. In the American Stales decision the Commission made
reference to this line of reasoning. SEC.iolding Co. Act. Release No. 7721, p. 11, Oct. 2,
1947.
9. See SEC Holding Co. Act Release No. 7720, p. 16, Sept. 30, 1947.
10. ". . . [A] determination whether past transactions in securities of companies sub-
ject to reorganizations . . .were ... influenced by the imminence of a plan, or . . . af-
fected .. .the terms or timing of the reorganization, are ... practically impo-sible to
make .... The factors involved are largely subjective .... Moreover, the painstaing
and extensive investigation necessary to sustain . . .a correct answer to such questions
[of good faith] ... imposes a burden on the administration of the Act that would seriously
impair its effective administration." Cities Service Company, SEC Holding Co. Act Release
No. 7720, p. 16, Sept. 30, 19417. See also Federal Water Service Corp., SEC Holding Co.
Act Release No. 5584, Feb. 7, 1945.
For similar difficulty in ascertaining motives in underwriting transactions, see L. Hand,
J., concurring in Morgan Stanley & Co. v. SEC, 126 F.2d 325,332 (C.C.A. 2d 1942).
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ment's fiduciary duty." It was the prospect of these difficulties which induced
the framers of the Bankruptcy Act to abandon a similar rule denying com-
pensation to protective committee members who had traded in debtor corpo-
ration securities during reorganization under that statute.
1 2
A second rule might forbid management trading which lacked prior ap-
proval by the SEC."3 Although such a formula has less retroactive effect
than the first proposal, the chore of identifying motives is not reduced but
merely performed at an earlier date. 14 Most important, approval of prospec-
tive trades would not materially assist the Commission in assessing a subse-
quent reorganization scheme. The temptation to increase the value of man-
agement holdings by selfish orientation of the reorganization plan would
remain. 15
The most satisfactory regulation would appear to be one placing an abso-
lute prohibition on all purchases by or for officers during reorganization.' 0
Violation of this ban would entail enforced sale of the securities to the corpo-
ration at cost or market price, whichever is lower.'" Even after this disgorg-
11. Whether the outside interests have been injured by fiduciary trading depends on
a determination of the treatment they would have received under a plan formulated by a
management not influenced by personal investment in certain of the securities. To determine
this, the Commission must either engage in sheer speculation or have the plan redrafted by
unbiased managers.
12. , See testimony of SEC Chairman Douglas in Hearings before Committee on the Judi-
ciary onH.R. 6439, as amended and reported as H.R. 8046,75th Cong., 1st Sess. 184 (1937).
13. See Att'y. Gen. Comm. Ad. Proc., SEC SEx. Doc. No. 10, PART 13, 77th Cong.,
1st Sess. 105 (1941).
14. The SEC might require full disclosure of inside information to all security holders
as a prerequisite to granting its permission. But ". . full disclosure . . . would require
the management to do the impossible job of bringing the investor up to its own level of ...
knowledge about the system, the course of internal negotiations, the attitude of the [SECi
staff and the future intentions of the management." Brief for Appellants, p. 46, SEC v.
Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194 (1947). Further difficulty inheres in the fact that only the
fiduciary knows whether a full disclosure has been made.
The common-law rule, pertaining to security transactions between managers and stock-
holders when no reorganization proceedings are pending, is that mere failure to disclose
information is not breach of a fiduciary relation in the absence of active misleading or
fraud. See Note, 84 A.L.R. 615 (1933). Most commentators, however, have supported the
minority view that a manager must make disclosures before trading in the corporation's
securities. Yourd, Trading in Securities by Directors, Officers and Stockholders: Section 16
of the Securities Exchange Act, 38 Mica L. Rav. 133, 140, n.31 (1939). At least one writer
has favored the majority rule. Walker, The Duty of Disclosure By a Director Purchasing
Stock From His Stockholders, 32 YALE L. J. 637 (1923).
15. See Federal Water Service Corp., SEC Holding Co. Act Release No. 5584, p. 29,
Feb. 7, 1945.
16. For a similar suggestion that protective committee members be prohibited alto-
gether from trading in securities and certificates of deposit subject to their trust, see Note,
46 YALE L. J. 143, 147-8 (1936). At present, § 212 of the Bankruptcy Act gives the court
discretion to approve participation of these fiduciary-held securities in the reorganized cor-
poration. 52 STAT. 895 (1938), 11 U.S.C. § 612 (1940). But § 249 absolutely denies compen-
sation for the services of a fiduciary who has traded. See note 20 infra.
17. If the utility lacked immediate funds for such purchases, the fiduciary could still
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ing, Commission ratification of the reorganization proposal would hinge on
an evaluation of the prejudice to holders of disfavored classes of securities
and the time lapse and expense necessitated by a reformulation of the plan. 8
Such a rule would supplement Section 17(b) of the Public Utility Holding
Company Act which shunts to affected corporations all profits realized by
management from security transactions initiated and completed within any
six months' period-whether in a normal or reorganization status."
Blanket prohibitions of the type advanced have been deemed necessary in
other situations found dangerous to the integrity of reorganization proceed-
ings. Section 249 of the Bankruptcy Act forbids compensation of fiduciaries
who buy or sell securities during reorganization, ' and SEC Rule U-62 pro-
hibits proxy solicitations regarding securities of utilities undergoing reorgan-
ization where the solicitor is trading in those securities.21 Furthermore, pos-
sible necessity of an absolute rule to meet the problem was recognized both
by the Commissioners who concurred in the Cities Service decision 2*- and by
the Supreme Court in the Chenery case.*- Certainly adoption of the suggested
policy would be an important step toward the goal of fair reorganizations. 2 4
be compelled to sell to the corporation. The latter would resell to the public and then pay
the fiduciary. Naturally, any excess of market price over cost (to the fiduciary) would be
retained by the utility.
18. Of course, officers and directors may well cease trading altogether when neither
corporation control nor profit is possible. See Brief for American States Utilities Corp. re
Purchases and Sales of Stock of Holding Company by Directors and Officers, p. 31, SEC
Holding Co. Act Release No. 7721, Oct. 2, 1947.
19. 49 STAT. 830 (1935), 15 U.S.C. § 79q(b) (1940). An exception is made if the security
was acquired in good faith for a preexisting debt. Section 16 of the Securities Exchange Act
contains a similar provision governing officers or directors of a corporation, the stocl" of
which is listed on a national securities exchange. 48 STAT. 896 (1934), 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b)
(1940).
Since both purchase and sale must be made within the six months' period in order to be
covered by § 17(b), sales consummated during reorganization but after six months from the
purchase date can be hit only by statutory amendment. The rule suggested in the text would,
however, apply to stock held at the reorganization plan date irrespective of when purchased
during the reorganization proceedings.
20. 52 STAT. 901 (1938), 11 U.S.C. § 649 (1940); Otis & Co. v. Insurance Bldg. Corp.,
110 F.2d 333 (C.C.A. 1st 1940); It re Midland United Co., 64 F. Supp. 399 (D. Del. 1946),
aff'd, 159 F.2d 340 (C.C.A. 3d 1947); In re Arcade Malleable Iron Co., 35 F. Supp. 461
(D. Mass. 1940); It re Mountain States Power Co., 35 F. Supp. 307 (D. Del. 1940), mod. on
other grounds, 118 F.2d 405 (C.C.A. 3d 1941). If, however, the security is acquired other
than by purchase, compensation may be allowed if the court approves.
For holdings, denying compensation under § 77B reorganizations, before the present
provision became effective, see it re Republic Gas Corp., 35 F. Supp. 300 (S.D.N.Y. 1936);
In re Paramount-Publix Corp., 12 F. Supp. 823 (S.D.N.Y. 1935), rev'd on other grounds,
83 F.2d 406 (C.C.A. 2d 1936), 83 F.2d 408 (C.C.A. 2d 1936); In re Consolidated Rock Prod-
ucts Co., 36 F. Supp. 912 (S.D. Cal. 1941). But cf. Donnelly v. Consolidated Inv. Trust,
99F.2d 185 (C.C.A. Ist 1938).
21. SEC Holding Co. Act Release No. 2836, June 23, 1941.
22. SEC Holding Co. Act Release No. 7720, pp. 21-2, Sept. 30, 1947.
23. See SEC v. Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80,92 (1942).
24. The rule cannot injure the honest fiduciary who is on notice of the limitation on his
freedom to invest. But even if the rule harshly voids a harmless transaction, that cone-
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CORPORATE DEATH AND CHAPTER X: DISSOLUTION
AS A BAR TO REORGANIZATION*
THE legal demise of a corporation is not instantaneous. At some point be-
tween the lethal blow of charter revocation and ultimate economic expiration
the business entity ceases to be a "corporation" subject to bankruptcy juris-
diction.1 But when?
In Chicago Title and Trust Co. v. 4186 Wilcox Bldg. Corp.,2 the leading
case on bankruptcy jurisdiction over a "dissolved corporation," the Supreme
Court established the principle that the bankruptcy courts must in determining
jurisdiction look to the degrpe of recognition accorded the "corporation" by
state law;3 and the Court denied reorganization to a petitioning corporation
whose charter had been rescinded for other than insolvency reasons. 4 Subse-
quence would be of secondary importance when compared with the potential damage to
outside interests occasioned by breach of trust.
The argument was made in the Chenery case that penalization of trading may induce
corporate inefficiency by preventing management from becoming shareholders and thereby
eliminating an incentive to produce profits. However, the Commission pointed out that its
order covered only those securities bought during reorganization and did not prevent the
officers from becoming shareholders in the reorganized corporation. Brief for Appellants,
p. 39, n.33, SEC v. Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80 (1942).
* In re Midwest Athletic Club, 161 F.2d 1005 (C.C.A. 7th 1947).
1. By § 106(3) of the Bankruptcy Act, Chapter X is made applicable to "a corpora-
tion, as defined in this Act, which could be adjudged a bankrupt under this Act .... " 52
STAT. 883 (1938), 11 U.S.C. § 506(3) (1940). Section 1(8) provides that a "'Corpora-
tion' shall include all bodies having any of the powers and privileges of private corpora-
tions not possessed by individuals or partnerships and shall include partnership associa-
tions organized under laws making the capital subscribed alone responsible for the debts
of the association .... unincorporated companies and associations ... ." 30 STAT. 544
(1898), as amended, 11 U.S.C. § 1(8) (1940).
2. 302 U.S. 120 (1937).
3. "How long and upon what terms a state created corporation may continue to exist
is a matter exclusively of state power.... [lit will hardly be claimed that the federal
government may breathe life into a corporate entity thus put to death by the state in the
lawful exercise of its overeign authority." Id. at 127-8.
4. In the Wilcox case an Illinois corporation had been dissolved by the state for
failure to file annual reports and to pay franchise taxes. Illinois statutes granted an ad-
ditional two year period during which corporate existence continued for purposes of wind-
ing up and provided further that expiration of this extension need not terminate suits
against the corporation initiated within the two year period if brought to enforce liability
incurred prior to dissolution. IL. Rav. STAT. ANN., c. 32, §§ 14, 79 (Smith-Hurd, 1929).
The corporation had filed a voluntary petition after the lapse of the two year period but
while still defending against such actions. The majority held the corporation non-existent
for all purposes but that of defending its pending suit; the dissent emphasized that the
retention of any corporate powers should be enough to bring the business unit within the
bankruptcy definition of a "corporation." Previous circuit court decisions had split on the
issue. Compare Vassar Foundry Co. v. Whiting Corp., 2 F.2d 240 (C.C.A. 6th 1924),
affirming In re Vassar Foundry Co., 293 Fed. 248 (D.C. Mich. 1923) (in accord with the
[Vol. 57
NOTES
quently the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, seeing no reason to
distinguish between voluntary and involuntary proceedings, in spite of sub-
stantial contrary authority,5 extended the Wilcox doctrine in the first of two
Wilcox opinion), %cith Capital Endowment Co. v. Kroeger, 86 F.2d 976 (C.C.A. 6th 1936)
(tacitly overruled in the Wilcox case).
The majority in the Wilcox case seemed undeniably influenced by the common law
notion which analogized dissolved corporations to deceased persons unable to sue or be
sued. See Greeley v. Smith, 10 Fed. Cas. 1075, No. 5,748 (C.C.D. Me. 1845) ; BALhA±-
=4 CORpO ATiOxS 722 (1946); STEvENs, ConRoRA'roNs 808 (1936); Marcus, Suabilty
of Dissolved Corporations, 58 HARv. L. Rnv. 675, 676 (1945).
For favorable comment on the controversial Wilcox decision, see Jurow, The Bank-
ruptcy Court and the Dissolved Corporation: The Wilcox Decision, Al Coan. REfo.G. &
Am. BAnR. REv. 167 (1938) ; Notes, 7 D-morr L. R-v. 153 (1938), 51 HAnv. L. RvLv. 546
(1938), 32 IL.T L. Rav. 728 (1938). For critical comment, see Notes, 38 CoL. L Rav. 504
(1938), 23 Coae. L. Q. 440 (1938), 26 Ir.. B. J. 207 (1938), 22 Muzzz. L. Rsv. 721 (1938),
24 VA. L. REv. 322 (1938). See also Jurow, Voluntary Reorganization of Dissolved Cor-
porations, Al Coip. REoRG. & Ai. BANEJI. Ray. 90 (1937); 13 Noa D'Az LA%,,,. 138
(1938) ; 86 U. oF PA. L. REv. 311 (1938).
5. The court in the Wilcox case had specifically declined to pass upon previous fed-
eral decisions dealing with involuntary proceedings. 302 U.S. 120, 124 (1937). For cases
sustaining involuntary petitions against corporations dissolved for non-compliance with
state statutes, see In re 211 East Delaware Place Bldg. Corp., 76 F.2d 834 (C.C.A. 7th
1935) ; In re Surf Bldg. Corp., 11 F. Supp. 295 (E.D. Ill. 1934) (petitions under 77B al-
lowed after expiration of winding up period provided by state law); In re Double Star
Brick Co., 210 Fed. 980 (N.D. Cal. 1913) (petition in bankruptcy allowed where statute
permitted trustees to settle affairs of dissolved corporations; no corporate existence con-
tinued). Cf. Old Fort Improvement Co. v. Lea, 89 F.2d 26 (C.C.A. 4th 1937) (petition
under 77B entertained where state statute permitted indefinite corporate retention of
powers after dissolution to settle affairs) ; In re Booth's Drug Store, 19 F. Supp. 95 (W.
Va. 1937); In re Munger Vehicle Tire Co., 159 Fed. 901 (C.C.A. 2d 1903) (petitions in
bankruptcy allowed under similar statute).
Where dissolution arose out of state insolvency proceedings, see Hammond v. Lyon
Realty Corp., 59 F2d 592 (C.C.A. 4th 1932) (absolute dissolution in prior state insol-
vency proceedings held not to place corporation outside jurisdiction of bankruptcy court) ;
In re Thomas, 78 F2d 602 (C.C.A. 6th 1935) (insolvent corporation held not able to evade
Bankruptcy Act by prior voluntary dissolution). Cf. In, re Watts and Sachs, 190 U.S. 1
(1903) ; Morehouse v. Giant Powder Corp., 206 Fed. 24 (C.C.A. 9th 1913) ; In re Adams
and Hoyt Co., 164 Fed. 489 (N.D. Ga. 1908) ; Cresson v. Stauffer, 148 Fed. 931 (C.C.A.
3d 1906) ; In re Storck Lumber Co., 114 Fed. 360 (D. Md. 19D2) ; Scheuer v. Smith and
Montgomery Co., 112 Fed. 407 (C.C.A. 5th 1901) ; Platt v. Archer, 19 Fed. aCs. 822, No.
11,213 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1872); Thornhill v. Bank of Louisiana, 23 Fed. Cas. 1139, No.
13,992 (C.C.D.La. 1870) ; In re Washington Marine Insurance Co., 29 Fed. Cas. 365, No.
17,246 (S.D.N.Y. 1868). But cf. Its re National Surety Co., 7 F. Supp. 959 (N.D.N.Y.
1934) (bankruptcy court held to lack jurisdiction of insurance company where debtor
divested of title by state statute).
See, in general, 6 CoiLmR, BANERnUTCY 1404 et seq. (Moore's ed. 1947) ; 1 id. 624 cf
seq.; FiN -rER, THn LAw OF BANxKRupcY REaOGANIMATiON 104 n.24 (1939); de
Funiak, Forfeiture, Dissolution or Inactivity of Corporation as Affecting Right of Re-
organization under 77B, Al Coin. REoRG. & Amr. BAKMR. REv. 216 (1938); 1 Gmmazs,
CoaoRA REotuA=ATioNs § 54 (1936) ; Bird, Financial Associations Which May Be
Reorganized Under Section 77B of the Bankruptcy Act, 15 TFx. L. Rav. 65 (1936); 1
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Peer Manor cases to refuse a creditors' petition against a corporation similarly
stripped of its charter.6 But ouster from a corporate franchise neither destroys
assets nor satisfies the claims of creditors. And on this premise, the same
court held, in later Peer Manor litigation," that though a corporation might
have lost de jure capacity,8 if, as was the case here, some or all of the original
shareholders had by "joint action" continued the business as before dissolu-
tion,9 the business entity could still qualify for bankruptcy jurisdiction as an
"unincorporated association" within the Act's definition of "corporation." 10
That which Peer Manor number one took away from the creditors of the
"corporation," Peer Manor number two retendered to creditors of the "unin-
corporated company or association."
But this pragmatic approach to the problem of the dissolved corporation
seems recently to have been abandoned by the court of its authorship, for
REmiNGTON, BANKRUPrCY § 100 (1934) ; Notes, 35 CoL. L. REv. 108 (1935), 48 HAiv. L.
REv. 676 (1935), 14 N.Y.U.L.Q. REv. 528 (1937), 22 VA. L. Rav. 465 (1935).
6. In re Peer Manor Bldg. Corp., 134 F.2d 839 (C.C.A. 7th 1943), ccrt. denied Sub
nor. Nikolas v. Witter, 320 U.S. 211 (1943).
In extending the Wilcox doctrine to cover involuntary petitions, Peer Manor number
one specifically overruled In re 211 East Delaware Bldg. Corp., 76 F.2d 834 (C.C.A. 7th
1935), and It re Park Beach Hotel Bldg. Corp., 96 F.2d 886 (C.C.A. 7th 1938), cert.
denied sub nor. Pancoe v. Southman, Trustee, 305 U.S. 638 (1938) (involuntary petition
entertained after expiration of winding up period where mortgage foreclosure proceedings
continued), finding itself compelled to do so by the "positive implications of law" in the
Wilcox case. In re Peer Manor Bldg. Corp., sitpra at 841. However, it did not see fit to
overrule In re 69th and Crandon Bldg. Corp., 97 F.2d 392 (C.C.A. 7th 1938), ecrt. denied
sub nor. Easthom-Melvin Co. v. Hoff man, 305 U.S. 629 (1938) (involuntary reorganiza-
tion petition permitted after expiration of Illinois extension period where involuntary
bankruptcy petition previously filed during this time).
Undeniably a logical extension of the Wilcox rationale in that it recognized the es-
sential similarity of voluntary and involuntary petitions for jurisdictional purposes, the
first Peer Manor case nevertheless carries questionable weight: of the three man court,
one judge dissented and another declined to rule on the jurisdictional issue.
7. It; re Peer Manor Bldg. Corp., 143 F.2d 769 (C.C.A. 7th 1944). In new reorgani-
zation proceedings concerning the identical dissolved corporation as in the first Peer
Manor case, the circuit court held, in granting jurisdiction, that the earlier decision was
neither res judicata nor binding as "law of the case."
8. Under Illinois law a corporation may be deprived of its de jure capacity for failure
to pay franchise taxes or to file annual reports. See ILL. STAT. ANN., c. 32, §§ 157,83-5,
157.95, 157.126 (Smith-Hurd, 1934). Despite a split of authority on whether a corpora-
tion remains de facto after forfeiture of its charter, Judge Evans in his dissent in the first
Peer Manor case stated that the corporation was de facto insofar as creditors' attempts to
reach its assets were concerned. In re Peer Ik1gnor Bldg. Corp., 134 F.2d 839, 843
(C.C.A. 7th 1943). This rationale appears to have been adopted by the second Peer
Mantor case.
9. The court, recognizing a going business, turned to the traditional definition of an
unincorporated company as "a number of persons united for carrying on anything jointly"
to bring it within the meaning of "unincorporated association" in § 1 (8). In re Peer
Manor Bldg. Corp., 143 F.2d 769 (C.C.A. 7th 1944). See In re Tidewater Coal Exchange,
280 Fed. 638, 643 (C.C.A. 2d 1922).
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in In re Midwest Athletic Club,"1 the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Cir-
cuit has resorted to essentially conceptual grounds to deny a creditors' petition
for reorganization. A state receiver was appointed for the M1idwest Athletic
Club under mortgage foreclosure proceedings in 1930, and the membership
dispersed. No sale of the assets was ever consummated and although in 1938
the corporate charter was revoked for failure to file an annual report,' Mid-
west continued to operate profitably. In 1946, five first mortgage bondholders
petitioned for reorganization of this "corporation";1" the district court took
jurisdiction 14 and enjoined further action by the state receiver. Although, as
in the second Peer Manwr case, commercial operation of the property ras con-
tinuing substantially unchanged, the Circuit Court of Appeals employed dic-
tionary definitions to reverse the district court, distinguishing the second Pecr
Manor case on the ground that a foreclosure receiver does not sufficiently rep-
resent the shareholders to satisfy the requirement of "joint action."'u
The distinction drawn seems tenuous. A foreclosure receiver is representa-
tive of shareholders at least to the extent of accumulating surplus for their
benefit.16 To draw a comparison, a statutory liquidation receiver under Illinois
10. See note 1 supra.
11. 161 F.2d 1005 (C.C.A. 7th 1947).
12. See note 8 supra.
13. The property was thus operated for sixteen years in the possession of the receiver.
No reason for this unusual delay appears except that tax liens of one million dollars were
not compromised until three years prior to the petition. Transcript of Record, p. 76, In. re
Midwest Athletic Club, 161 F.2d 1005 (C.C-.A 7th 1947). The bondholders committee,
furthermore, had been unable to finance payment to non-depositing bondholders. Id. at 162.
14. Although the club was chartered as a not-for-profit corporation the district
court had found it to be sufficiently engaged in a commercial enterprise to be subject to
reorganization. Id. at 163. See note 22 infra.
15. "As we held in the second Peer Manor case, to constitute the siockholders of a
dissolved corporation an unincorporated company, such stockholders, or some of them,
must continue the business. They must act jointly in doing business under the corporate
name. Congress did not intend by Chapter X to provide for the reorganization of pieces of
property held by several persons with a community of interest." In re Midwest Athletic
Club, 161 F2d 1005, 1008 (C.C.A. 7th 1947). Nor could the receiver, "a mere custodial
officer of the court ... be considered as operating the corporation property for the corpo-
ration or its members... :' Id. at 10G9. See Chicago City Ry. v. People of Ill. ex rcl.
Hall, 116 Ill. App. 633, 640 (1904). For its interpretation of "an unincorporated company
or association" the court relied on Webster's Dictionary and the definition of It, re Tide-
water Coal Exchange, 280 Fed. 638, 643 (C.C.A. 2d 1922), which in turn quoted the Cen-
tury Dictionary. In re Midwest Athletic Club, supra at 1003.
The Court assumed, in the absence of Illinois authority, that title was vested in the
members as tenants in common. Id. at 1008. This proposition seems well established law
elsewhere. See Gardiner v. Automatic Arms Co., 275 Fed. 697, 700 (N.D.N.Y. 1921);
In re Welch's Estate, 243 Ala. 337, 342, 10 So2d 5, 10 (1942) ; Stone v. Edvards, 32 Ga.
App. 479, 485, 124 S.E. 54, 56 (1924). A remaining issue in the case, the district court's
finding of good faith in filing the petition, was not passed upon by the circuit court of
appeals.
16. The receiver appears to represent the mortgagor in that he is preserving the
property while applying the rents and profits to payment of the indebtedness. See Bo-
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law17 represents both creditors and shareholders insofar as any beneficial in-
terest is concerned.18 Although distinctions between foreclosure and liquida-
tion receivers may be justified in other instances,1" it is difficult to perceive
any functional difference as to representative capacity. Though the court
glossed over the fact, the club members were effectively prevented by ap-
pointment of a state receiver from maintaining "joint action." Under such
circumstances denial of relief to creditors on a nuance of the law of receivers
seems unwarranted.20
The Midwest emphasis upon doctrinal at the expense of economic con-
siderations stems, however, from the Wilcox case. If, for purposes of the Bank-
ruptcy Act, a corporation had been construed not in terms of state law, but
rather in terms of continuation of commercial activities, the "joint action" de-
gardus v. Moses, 181 Ill. 554, 559, 54 N.E. 984, 986 (1889). Cf. Davis v. Dale, 150 Ill. 239,
37 N.E. 215 (1894). In particular, if a receiver were continued beyond foreclosure sale,
the rents and profits would be collected during the period of redemption for the benefit of
the person entitled to the'equity of redemption. Powell v. Voight, 348 Ill. 605, 181 N.E.
403 (1932) ; Haigh v. Carroll, 209 Ill. 576, 71 N.E. 317 (1904) ; Stevens v. Hadfield, 178
Ill. 532, 52 N.E. 875 (1899). And the possessor of the equity of redemption would be able
to hold the receiver accountable. Standish v. Musgrove, 223 Ill. 500, 79 N.E. 161 (1906).
Thus at least subsequent to the sale the receiver would appear a representative of the
mortgagor. But the representative nature of a foreclosure receiver would not seem signifi-
cantly altered merely by sale. Although he is considered an officer of the court at all times
and is not bound by private covenants beyond the scope of the mortgage, as the district
judge below remarked, the receiver "is conducting a business for the benefit of creditors
and finally for the benefit of ... certificate holders, whatever interest they may have."
See Opinion of District Court, Transcript of Record, p. 73, In re Midwest Athletic Club,
161 F.2d 1005 (C.C.A. 7th 1947) ; 2 GrNN, MORGAGES § 187.1.
17. See IL. STAT. ANN., c. 32, § 157.87 (Smith-Hurd, 1934).
18. Evans v. Illinois Surety Co., 298 Ill. 101, 131 N.E. 262 (1921). He has also been
considered to be in the nature of a trustee for both creditors and stockholders. Sec Re-
public Life Insurance Co. v. Swigert, 135 Ill. 150, 168, 25 N.E. 680, 685 (1890). But even
if deemed a trustee, the statutory receiver holds property for the benefit of others, and
would still appear a functional representative of shareholders.
19. For example, it is unquestioned that a federal court in ordinary bankruptcy pro-
ceedings lacks summary jurisdiction to compel delivery of property where a state receiver
has been appointed as an incident to enforcement of a lien; but receivers under state
insolvency proceedings are entirely superseded. Emil v. Hanley, 318 U.S. 515 (1943),
affirming 130 F.2d 369 (C.C.A. 2d 1942) ; Straton v. New, 283 U.S. 318 (1931) ; Isaacs v.
Hobbs, 282 U.S. 734 (1931). For a general discussion of the differences among types of
receivers, see GLENN, LIQUmATION § 304 (1935).
20. It is also arguable that a sufficient corporate entity was here preserved for bank-
ruptcy jurisdiction in that liability of ex-members as tenants in common remained limited.
See note 15 supra. Dissolution of a corporation does not have the effect of converting
stockholders into partners. Tarbell v. Page, 24 Ill. 46 (1860) ; Jones v. Jones, 265 Il1. App.
149 (1932). Something in the nature of a corporate privilege may thus be perpetuated
which is "not possessed by individuals or partnerships" within the meaning of the bank-
ruptcy definition of corporation. See note 1 supra.
The probable absence of membership equity in the assets of the club would not
in itself bar reorganization. See In re Equity Co. of America, 115 F2d 570, 572 (C.C.A.
7th 1940) ; In re Central Funding Corp., 75 F.2d 256, 259 (C.C.A. 2d 1935).
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vice of the second Peer Manor decision need not have been invoked. Under the
Wilcox rule, the business could have been adjudicated a bankrupt during the
two year winding up period provided by Illinois law following dissolution,
when it could sue and be sued in its corporate name.2 1 But the lapse of this sta-
tutory period worked no change in the actual position of the business as a going
enterprise. Since the corporate entity is fundamentally a vehicle for the assem-
bly and operation of massed capital-the real unit for all practical purposes2
-and since the Bankruptcy Act indicates an intention to treat as an entity
whatever association may be so regarded in business contemplationi it would
seem to follow that jurisdiction might be invoked as to the remaining assets
wherever the business is an active economic unit for which reorganization is
commercially feasible. Extension of the benefits of Chapter X to its furthest
reasonable limits is particularly desirable where it is found, as in the Midwest
case, that state court proceedings provide an inadequate remedy.!
21. IL. STAT. ANx., c. 32, § 157.94 (Smith-Hurd, Supp. 1947). This present statute
goes further than the statute in effect when the Wilcox case was decided in that it permits
suits by as well as against the corporation to be continued after the two year period if
initiated within it. This further indicium of corporate capacity might have been used to
distinguish the Wilcox case.
That a dissolved corporation could have been declared a bankrupt if proceedings were
instituted within the two year period was indicated, but not specifically passed on, by the
Wilcox case. In re International Sugar Feed Co., 23 F. Supp. 197 (D. Minn. 1938), sub-
sequently held that a voluntary petition filed within the extension period could be enter-
tamined.
22. See GITxN, LIQuIDATION § 246 (1935). Susceptibility to the Bankruptcy Act is
not necessarily determined by the legal status of a business unit, as is exemplified in the
case of non-profit enterprises whose operations the courts will explore to determine
whether they are actually engaged in a business project. In re Wisconsin Co-operative
Milk Pool, 119 F.2d 999 (C.C.A. 7th 1941) ; In re Roumanian Workers Educational As-
sociation of America, 108 F.2d 782 (C.C.A. 6th 1940); In re McKinley Lodge, 4 F. Supp.
280 (S.D. N.Y. 1933).
23. "We think Congress intended to include all business enterprises which were un-
able to meet their debts and whose creditors had more faith in a reorganization than in a
mortgage foreclosure." Evans, J., in In re Peer Manor Bldg. Corp., 143 F.2d 769, 772
(C.C.A. 7th 1944). The readjustment of secured indebtedness, a principal feature of Chap-
ter X, may be "just as necessary to the various bodies comprised within the broad definition
of 'corporations' as to corporations in the restricted sense. . . ." Weinstein, Corporations
Amenable to Section 77B, 83 U. oF P.. L. Rn,. 853, 863 (1935).
It appears that Congress was basically attempting in the 1926 redefinition of "corpo-
ration' to reach Massachusetts trusts. See 67 CONG. REc. 7675 (1926). Specifically in-
cluded is "any business conducted by a trustee, or trustees, wherein... ownership is
evidenced by [a] certificate." 44 STAT. 662 (1926), as amended, 11 U.S.C. § 1(8) (1940).
But Congress further provided that the term "corporation" shall include "unincorporated
companies and associations," whereas prior to 1926 only companies with official charters
had been amenable to bankruptcy. Surely this addition would indicate an intent to extend
bankruptcy jurisdiction to types of business enterprise, otherwise susceptible to the Act,
whose legal status might not be clearly defined.
24. A proposed sale of deposited bonds by the bondholder's committee, which would
have permitted the purchaser to dominate reorganization outside the federal courts, ap-
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The Supreme Court in the Wilcox case, recognizing the principle of federal
supremacy in the field of liquidation of debtors' estates, acknowledged that
had the decree of corporate dissolution arisen from state insolvency proceed-
ings, the federal court might properly have determined its own jurisdiction
without reference to the status of the "corporation" under state law. The
Court, however, could discern no conflict with federal bankruptcy powers
where the charter revocation arose from other than insolvency proceedings,25
and avoided what it apparently considered to be an encroachment upon tradi-
tional state control of local corporations.
But the policing of corporations is not reserved solely to the state of in-
corporation, 26 and it is difficult to perceive where state interests are jeopaidized
by a bankruptcy court's taking jurisdiction of corporate assets to satisfy credi-
tors. In the case of Chapter X, proceedings designed to enable creditors to
realize their claims to the fullest extent through reorganization do not appear
to conflict with state concern that a corporation must fulfill certain legal re-
quirements.2 7 The state has no antagonism to creditors' salvaging what they
can from corporate assets, whether through reorganization or liquidation.25
By the Wilcox doctrine, corporate amenability to reorganization must be
tested by the degree of state recognition rather than the realities of com-
parently influenced the district court in finding need for Chapter X relief. Transcript of
Record, p. 162, It re Midwest Athletic Club, 161 F.2d 1005 (C.C.A. 7th 1947).
25. "While state laws in conflict with the laws of Congress on the subject of bank-
ruptcies are suspended, they are suspended 'only to the extent of actual conflict. . . .' The
dissolution effected under Illinois law is in no way related to a state of insolvency or bank-
ruptcy." Chicago Title & Trust Co. v. 4136 Wilcox Bldg. Corp., 302 U.S. 120, 126 (1937).
26. For example, a corporation doing business in a state, not the state of its origin,
can be made subject to a statute continuing its existence after dissolution for purposes of
suits. See Clark v. Williard, 292 U.S. 112, 119 (1934) ; ef. Washington v. Superior Court,
289 U.S. 361 (1933) ; Trounstine v. Bauer, Pogue & Co., 144 F.2d 379 (C.C.A. 2d 1944).
See Marcus, stepra note 4, at 692. Some cases, prior to Wilcox, appeared to adopt this
dual-responsibility rationale in stating that dissolution of a corporation should not deprive
federal courts of paramount power over the distribution of property of an insolvent corpo-
ration. See In re 4136 Wilcox Bldg. Corp., 86 F.2d 667, 669 (C.C.A. 7th 1936); Ham-
mond v. Lyon Realty Corp., 59 F.2d 592, 594 (C.C.A. 4th 1934) ; In rc 211 East Delaware
Place Bldg. Corp., 76 F.2d 834, 836 (C.C.A. 7th 1935) ; In re Double Star Brick Co., 210
Fed. 980, 982 (N.D. Cal. 1913).
27. Cardozo pointed out in his dissent to the Wilcox case that any plan of reorganiza-
tion must necessarily be in conformity with state law or fail and that no real conflict with
state policy exists. Chicago Title and Trust Co. v. 4136 Wilcox Bldg, Corp., 302 U.S.
120, 133 (1937). If reorganization is successful, the corporation that emerges must
be lawfully chartered by Illinois or some other state; and if not chartered by the
state of dissolution, it must obtain a license to do business therein and otherwise must
comply with her laws relative to foreign corporations. The intention of the state that the
corporation should die is of no significance per se, for the business entity could undoubtedly
have been reorganized within the extension period. See 6 CoLuauu, BANXRUIPTcY 1407
(Moore's ed. 1947) ; Note, 38 CoL. L. REv. 504, 507 (1938).
28. There is even less reason for concern over conflicting interests where the assets
are to be administered in ordinary bankruptcy, for revocation of the charter necessarily
looks to eventual liquidation. See Note, 23 CORN. L. Q. 440, 442 n.9 (1938).
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mercial activity. Created in contemplation of an imaginary conflict with state
prerogative, the doctrine has unnecessarily curtailed the scope of the national
bankruptcy powers ;- has resulted in needless confusion ,3 and has extended
to corporate management the opportunity utilized by the bondholders' commit-
tee in the Midwest case to avoid the rigorous supervision of federal reorgan-
ization by technical non-compliance with state requirements. Discard of the
Wilcox doctrine is long overdue.
29. The generic Wilcox distinction between state-instituted dissolution and dissolu-
tion arising out of insolvency appears unrealistic if its specific operation obstructs federal
power in one instance as in the other. ". .. No such simple device as technical dissolution
should be allowed to supplant the federal jurisdiction with that of the states.' Tondel,
Corporations Eligible for Relief Under 77B, 21 MINxN. L. REv. 144, 161 (1936).
30. Compare In re Pacific Alloy & Steel Co., 299 Fed. 952 (C.C.A. 9th 1924). and
Watts v. Liberty Royalties Corp., 106 F.2d 941 (C.C.A. 10th 1939) (voluntary petitions
entertained when corporation dissolved under state law allowing reinstatement of charter),
with Seaboard Terminals Corp. v. Standard Oil, 35 F. Supp. 566 (S.D.N.Y. 1940), and
In re Columbia Hotel Co., 29 F. Supp. 848 (W.D. Mich. 1939) (dissolved corporations
held incapable of reorganization although charters merely suspended); comnpare Partan
v. Niemi, 288 Mass. 111, 192 N.E. 527 (1934) (voluntary petition may be entertained where
dissolution "conditional"), with Cushman Motor Works v. Commissioner, 130 F.2d 977
(C.C.A. 8th 1942) (conditionally dissolved corporation not authorized to be a party to re-
organization under tax statute) ; compare In re 69th and Crandoni Bldg. Corp., 97 F.2d
392 (C.C.A. 7th 1938), and In re International Sugar Feed Co., 23 F. Supp. 197 (D. Mina.
1938) (bankruptcy jurisdiction taken where petitions filed within extension period), with
Grand Lodge, Knights of Pythias v. O'Connor, 95 F.2d 477 (C.C.A. 5th 1938) (jurisdic-
tion denied where charter ousted in quo warranto, although final order of dissolution not
entered). Cf. McClung v. Hill, 96 F.2d 236 (C.C.A. 5th 1938) (prior to revival of ousted
franchise, no authority existed to file voluntary petition) ; McLaughlin Land & Livestock
Co. v. Bank of America, Nat. Trust and Say. Ass'n, 94 F.2d 491 (C.C.A. 9th 1938)
(corporation with suspended franchise not a "farming corporation" within § 75(r));
Holpuch v. United States, 58 F. Supp. 560 (Ct. CL. 1945) (action maintained for breach of
contract entered into during suspension of charter). It seems clear, however, that dis-
solution subsequent to filing does not deprive the federal court of jurisdiction. Bache V.
Louisiana Oil Refining Corp., 97 F2d 445 (C.C.A. 5th 1938) ; State of Missouri ex rel.
Dorr v. A. B. Collins and Co., 34 F. Supp. 550 (W.D. Mo. 1940).
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